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Social history has two callings, one the echo of the other. The first calling is 
retrospective: it consists of asking how the world we live in came into being, 
and how its coming into being affected the everyday lives of ordinary people. 
That inquiry necessarily begins with some sort of moral, political, and ideolo- 
gical commitment,  however vague or veiled, for we cannot begin the inquiry 
without making some features of our own world problematic, thereby assum- 
ing or neglecting others. I believe, for example, that the two great circum- 
stances which distinguish life in our own era from life at any other time are 
the extraordinary power of the strange organizations we call national states 
and the prevalence of work for wages under conditions of expropriation. If 
so, the retrospective inquiry must single out for analysis the implantation of 
national states, the process of proletarianization, and the joint consequences 
of those two large changes for the everyday lives of ordinary people. 
Social history's second calling is prospective: it consists of asking what could 
have happened to everyday experience at major historical choice points, and 
then inquiring how and why outcomes which actually occurred won out over 
other possibilities. The prospective inquiry is, if anything, riskier than the 
retrospective: full of history in the as-if, vulnerable to dubious causalities and 
vulgar determinisms, impossible to pursue without strong theoretical commit- 
ments. It requi~es a curious combination of hubris and humility; the provision- 
al adoption of hypotheses spanning reality and potentiality, the readiness to 
alter or jettison those hypotheses as the evidence unfolds. We must, for 
example, be prepared to ask whether the frequent, concrete, partly realized 
demands for popular sovereignty that appeared in the collective action of 
North American colonists from the Stamp Act crisis onward could have inform- 
ed a more thoroughgoing democratic revolution, and how. Yet we must also 
be ready to conclude that the Revolution was not actually a major choice 
point, that the structure of power that emerged from the Revolution had 
locked unshakably into place long before. 
The retrospective and prospective inquiries echo each other like rockfalls on 
opposite sides of a steep ravine. Our sense of what is problematic in our con- 
temporary world depends, in part, on a notion of what other shapes the world 
could have taken. But the alternatives somehow visible in the contemporary 
world provide likely starting places for hypotheses concerning what could 
have happened in the past. We may dream of synthesizing the retrospective 
and prospective inquires in an account of the selective creation of the world 
we know out of all the forms of social life which could have come into being. 
For the most part, however, the retrospective and prospective analyses take 
us to different hypotheses, methods, and bodies of evidence. The social scien- 
ces have roles in both of social history's callings. In both cases, oddly enough, 
the chief contribution the social sciences can make is not methodological, but 
theoretical. Not that history should fulfill the fears of Gareth Stedman Jones, 
and become the proving ground for theories manufactured by non-historians. 
Not that historians should content themselves with being harvesters of Facts 
for the great mill of Economic Theory. The social sciences have a theoretical 
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role to play in social history because their practit ioners spend a good deal of 
their time codifying, crystallizing, and making visible the same sorts of theo- 
ries that historians commonly employ. As a consequence, they generate an 
accessible record of the successes and failures of different theories, of the 
assumptions, methods, and evidence they entail, and of the points at which 
they genuinely contradict  each other. Social historians can save themselves 
plenty of grief by observing closely what happens when sociologists, anthro- 
pologists, political scientists, and economists a t tempt  to apply or test theories 
of modernization;  on the whole, the outcomes are disastrous. For  the retro- 
spective mode of social history, the social sciences provide a convenient inven- 
tory of problematic features of the contemporary world, and a partial codifi- 
cation of alternative accounts of their emergence. For  the prospective mode 
of social history, the social sciences offer crude but comprehensive maps of 
likely directions in which social life could move from any particular origin. 
Far from being sopped up by the sponge of social science, however, social 
history - retrospective and prospective - has an oppor tuni ty  to clean up the 
social sciences. The greatest need of the social sciences today is for historically- 
grounded theories and analyses. By "historically grounded" I mean taking 
place and, especially, time explicitly and seriously into consideration. Theories 
of work-discipline that deduce the forms of control over producers in setting 
after setting from the logic of production itself, without systematic variation 
by place and time, lack historical grounding. To the extent  that such theories 
take the cumulative experience of capitalists and workers as part of the expla- 
nation of the character of work-discipline under capitalism, those theories 
acquire historical grounding. Historically-grounded theories are not all sound 
or fruitful; explanations of changes in industrial organization as results of a 
continuous, world-wide process of invention and diffusion, for instance, are 
historically grounded but, to my mind, seriously misleading. Some of the 
ideas now parading under the banner of "world-system theory"  must be wrong, 
if only because they contradict  each other. Historical grounding does not  
guarantee truth. Still, in the present state of the social sciences even inadequate 
historically-grounded theories are more useful than the timeless, placeless 
accounts of social change which now prevail. Social history, properly pursued, 
will identify and elaborate the superior brands of historically-grounded theory.  
That is a good reason for applauding the renewal of marxist theory in social 
history;  historically-grounded marxist work is beginning to reshape the think- 
ing of social scientists about changes in family structure, statemaking, popu- 
lar protest,  and a wide variety of other topics. Social historians, the students 
of the interplay between large social transformations and everyday life, have 
two callings which can, if intelligently heeded, renew the social sciences. 
Has social history gone awry? The last few years have certainly been a reces- 
sion for the enthusiasms of ten years ago: for studies of everyday life, for 
quantification, for self-conscious use of models and methods plucked from 
the social sciences. One source of that recession seems to be the jockeying for 
posit ion which occurs inevitably in an overstaffed profession faced with a 
long period of contraction. A disproportionate number of the historians now 
competing for senior positions in North America and Western Europe come 
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from those cohor ts  of  graduate s tudents  who responded most  eagerly to the 
call of  social history.  Meanwhile,  college and university curricula - and there- 
fore the jobs  to staff  those curricula - have shrunk back toward their  hard 
core of  poli t ical  his tory.  Should social historians get those jobs,  and the 
resources that  go with them? If  so, o ther  sorts of  historians will not  get those 
jobs,  and the future  of  the profession will be correspondingly different.  The 
bo t t l eneck  in emp loymen t ,  fellowships,  and financial suppor t  threatens every 
teacher  of  graduate s tudents  in history.  It lends urgency to the debate. A 
second, more impor tan t ,  reason for the recession in enthusiasm for social his- 
tory lies within the enterprise itself. It  is disillusion among those who once 
held large hopes for the t ransformat ion  of  historical  inquiry as a whole by 
means of collective biography,  quant i f ica t ion,  social-scientific approaches,  
and r igorous studies of  everyday behavior.  They have discovered some impor-  
tant  truths:  
1. These forms of social history require a great deal of work for an uncertain outcome. 
2. On the whole, the social-scientific approaches historians have adopted are better at 
specifying what is to be explained than at providing explanations - especially expla- 
nations which other historians will recognize as such. 
3. The consequenceofanextensivedeploymentofcollective biography or other standard 
social-historical methods is often negative: the discovery that the original question 
was faulty, a finding of no relationship, and so on. With other historical methods, 
however, it is harder to discover that one is wrong. 
4. Data collected for their own sake rarely yield arguments or conclusions. Massive 
evidence, however refined, is no substitute for reflection disciplined by theory. 
5. Historians working in any particular time-place field normally hold to a well-defined, 
if often imphcit, agenda: some questions are worth asking, while most questions are 
not. They pay attention to work that poses challenging answers to established ques- 
tions. A social historian who takes up new subjects, materials, or methods has the 
choice of a) showing how the results bear on questions about which other historians 
already care; b) attempting to change the agenda; c) forming a new discipline with its 
own agenda; or d) getting no recognition for his/her effort. 
By and large, recent  calls for anthropological  work,  for the study of  mentali- 
tids, and for more rigorous marxist  analyses reflect  a recogni t ion,  however  
dim, of  these truths.  They call for  a rapprochement  of  social-historical work  
with the established historical  agenda, and for the in t roduc t ion  of  explana- 
t ions o the r  historians will more  readily recognize as explanat ions.  The t ruths 
are impor tan t ;  everyone should have known them a decade ago. I hope social 
historians can learn them,  absorb them,  surmont  them,  and then get on with 
the ef for t  w i thou t  abandoning their  callings: asking how the world we live in 
came into being, and how its coming into  being affected the everyday lives of  
ordinary people ;  asking what  could tlave happened  to everyday exper ience at 
major  historical  choice points,  and then inquiring how and why the ou tcomes  
won  out  over o ther  possibilities. The abandonment  of  these two great callings 
would  impoverish the whole historical  enterprise.  
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